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DIGITAL AGE STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS UNDER
AUSTRALIAN LAW: "WRAP" AGREEMENTS,
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION, AND BINDING
ARBITRATION CLAUSES
JOHN ADAMS"
Abstract: Despite the widespread use of end user agreements ("EULAs") within
international e-commerce, their enforceability under Australian law has yet to be
adjudicated. Legislative reform and judicial clarification of contract standards may be
required for Australian courts to validate the methods of standard form contracting used
in the digital age. While existing Anglo-Australian nules regarding contract formation
may be adequate to enforce EULAs, the doctrine of privity presents an unnecessary and
outdated barrier to the enforcement. Accordingly, the Australian legislature should
abolish the doctrine of privity. In addition, Australian courts must clarify what type of
notice is required for onerous contractual terms.
Australian law also must develop standards for enforcing especially controversial
clauses found within EULAs. Although exclusive jurisdiction and binding arbitration
clauses have become increasingly important in international e-commerce, their
enforceability against consumers in mass-market contracts presents troubling public
policy questions. U.S. and E.U. law offer potential models for development of Australian
law governing business-to-business and business-to-consumer adhesion contracts.
Implementation of a stronger enforcement policy with respect to jurisdiction clauses in
the business-to-business context, while maintaining a consumer protection approach for
jurisdiction clauses in the consumer context, would be the optimal course of action for
Australia. For binding arbitration clauses, Australia law should promote fair arbitration
procedures for consumers by empowering judges to amend unfair aspects of consumer
arbitration clauses.
I. INTRODUCTION
The enforceability of "end user license agreements" ("EULAs") is a
subject that has generated significant debate in recent years, giving a new
lease on life to the old controversy surrounding standard form contracts.
Those who oppose the use of shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and browse-wrap
agreements in software transactions and e-commerce transactions argue that
such contracts lack true consent and facilitate the imposition of unduly one-
sided terms.' Those who favor the validity of such agreements argue that
EULAs in no way differ from other standard form contracts, such as
warranty agreements, insurance policies, and contracts of passage, which
t John W. Adams, LLB, masters candidate (University of Melbourne).
See, e.g., David A. Szwak, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act [UCLTA.]: The
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have existed for over a century.2 Proponents of such contracts argue that
these licenses present a practical way of doing instantaneous business over
the Internet. 3 Indeed, click-wrap agreements have become the predominant
kind of standard form contract used in the sale of goods and services over
the Internet.
Despite the widespread use of shrink-wrap, click-wrap, and browse-
wrap agreements, the enforceability of such documents under Australian law
has yet to be resolved. One may look to U.S. courts to discern judicial
trends elsewhere regarding such agreements. Over the past decade, U.S.
courts have seen a proliferation of litigation over EULAs and, after initial
resistance, have accepted their validity as a necessary incident of the
information economy. Although recent U.S. cases demonstrate that EULAs
may be prima facie enforceable, it is more difficult to tell whether certain
typical clauses contained within such agreements will be enforced. In
addition to clauses that purport to authorize the use of intellectual property,
EULAs often include terms such as limitations of liability, exclusive
jurisdiction clauses, binding arbitration clauses, and clauses that purport to
restrict uses of information that would otherwise be legitimate under
national copyright laws. Such clauses, especially when found in consumer
contracts, have been controversial and have at times been found void due to
considerations of public policy or unconscionability.4
This Article considers the enforceability of EULAs under Australian
law and argues that legislative reform is likely required for Australia to keep
pace with the methods of standard form contracting used in the information
age. Part II illustrates that the judicial reasoning behind the enforcement of
EULAs in the United States is virtually identical with the reasoning
employed in Anglo-Australian cases addressing the enforceability of ticket
terms. Despite this close legal parallel, it is probable that the doctrine of
privity will rear its ugly head to deny EULA enforcement in Australia,
except where a software company directly sells its product to the purchaser.
Although the common law contractual principles of "incorporation by
notice" and "acceptance by conduct" are adequate to deal with the question
2 See, e.g., John J.A. Burke, Reinventing Contract, 10 MuRDOCH U. ELEC. J.L. 2, para. 18 (2003),
available at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/vl0n2/burkel02_text.html (last visited May 21,
2004).
3 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996).
4 See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding an arbitration
agreement in a consumer contract unconscionable under the circumstances). America Online, Inc. v.
Superior Court of Alameda County, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (finding an exclusive
jurisdiction clause in a consumer online service agreement void due to public policy and
unconscionability).
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of assent to a EULA, abrogation of the privity doctrine may be necessary for
software developers to gain the benefit of EULAs.
Because the consideration of every typical EULA term that consumer
groups abhor is beyond the scope of this Article, Part III focuses on the
enforceability of two kinds of contract terms that have resurged in the trans-
national context of e-commerce: exclusive jurisdiction and binding
arbitration clauses. In international transactions, such clauses have been
widely used among merchants for centuries to facilitate certainty in dispute
resolution by electing, for example, a neutral forum or a more efficient
dispute resolution process. Through the Internet, however, long distance
retail sales are likely to become more prevalent than ever before. Therefore,
a different approach may be warranted where a party to such a clause is a
consumer who has limited bargaining power and lacks the resources to
engage in foreign litigation.
This Article concludes by arguing that that in comparison with U.S.
and E.U. law, Australia's approach to enforcing exclusive jurisdiction
clauses is outdated and does little for certainty in the dispute resolution
process. With respect to business-to-business transactions, Australia should
adopt a test that more closely tracks the U.S. model, which is similar to the
E.U. model. However, in the business-to-consumer context, it is suggested
that E.U. law forms the better model for Australia because it acknowledges
that consumers need to be protected from foreign litigation arising as a result
of retail e-commerce transactions. In relation to consumer arbitration, U.S.
and E.U. approaches are quite polarized. Adoption of a moderate approach
thdt accounts for the benefits that arbitration offers in a dispute between
distant parties would be preferable in Australia.
II. THE GENERAL ENFORCEABILITY OF EULAS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND AUSTRALIA
In all common law systems, contract formation is largely based on the
legal constructs of offer and acceptance. 6 At common law, an offer is an
unequivocal statement of a willingness to be bound by certain terms,7 and a
5 This Article addresses the enforcement of jurisdiction and arbitration clauses by the grant of a stay
of proceedings or summary dismissal when litigation is pursued in breach of the clause. Enforcement of
such clauses through damages awards, anti-suit injunctions and orders compelling arbitration is beyond the
scope of this Article. Furthermore, this Article does not consider non-exclusive or optional arbitration
clauses because it is highly unlikely that a court would grant a stay in the face of litigation brought in
breach of such clauses.
6 G. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 8 (10th ed., 1999).
7 id.
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contract is formed when the offeree accepts those terms without variation.8
An acceptance that varies the terms of the offer is construed as a counter-
offer under common law rules.
9
This offer and acceptance approach was, however, ideally suited only
to freely negotiated contracts. Since the late nineteenth century, the advent
of standard form contracting required courts to adapt to the reality of the
"battle of the forms" in commercial negotiations and the notion of
"acceptance by conduct" and "incorporation by notice" in consumer
contracts.' 0 This purposive approach to the issue of contract formation is
best reflected in Article 2-204(1) of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C."), which provides that "a contract for sale of goods may be made
in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract". While
Australian law lacks a similar codification, Australian courts take the same
substantive approach under the common law.
12
EULAs are likely to be the most modem class of standard form mass-
market contract. Their validity has yet to be tested under Australian law.
This Part analyzes whether current Australian contract law is adequate to
deal with EULAs and what kind of reforms, if any, are required to give such
agreements full legal effect. While no Australian court has yet adjudicated
the enforceability of a EULA, the United States has, over the past ten years,
developed a substantial body of case law on the subject. Because of the
strong similarity between U.S. and Australian contract law, an examination
of U.S. case law provides valuable insight into the legal issues that may arise
when a EULA comes before an Australian court.
A. U.S. Law Regarding EULAs
In the United States, the debate over the validity of EULAs has been
divisive. Most of the controversy has centered on the proposed U.C.C.
Article 2B and its progeny the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act ("UCITA"). ' 3 This law was developed in light of the perception that
Article 2 of the U.C.C. was inappropriate and inadequate for addressing
' Id. at 18-19.
9 J.W. CARTER & D.J. HARLAND, CONTRACT LAW IN AUSTRALIA 24 (4th ed., 2002).
0 Id. at 45.
U.C.C. §2-204(1) (2003).
12 CARTER & HARLAND, supra note 9, at 24-27.
" NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM COMPUTER
INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (UCITA) (2001), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/ucita0l.htm (last visited May 21, 2004) [hereinafter UCITA].
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software transactions.' 4  UCITA's main purpose was to regulate the
contractual aspects of the information economy.' 5  It purported to validate
EULAs and to legitimize practices such as licensee "self help.'
' 6
Due to the ardent lobbying of consumer groups, business users of
software and states' Attorneys General, the main sponsors of the UCITA
have formally abandoned their endorsement of the proposal.' 7 Despite the
Act's lack of legislative progress, the UCITA represents the most detailed
articulation of the contractual aspects of the information economy.'
8
Accordingly, the UCITA is worth considering as it provides a readily
transplantable body of law should it be found that Australian law requires
reform. The U.S. common law position in relation to shrink-wrap, click-
wrap, and browse-wrap agreements is considered first, followed by a
comparison of the provisions of the UCITA. It must be noted that the
UCITA leaves arbitration agreements to be regulated by other statutes.' 9
1. U.S. State Common Law and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code
a. Shrink-wrap agreements
Shrink-wrap licenses derive their name from the manner by which
they purport to bind licensees. Software boxes are often wrapped in clear
plastic wrapping. Beneath this wrapping lies a notice that informs the
14 Phillip Johnson, All Wrapped Up? A Review of the Enforceability of "Shrink-wrap " and "Click-
wrap" Licenses in the United Kingdom and the United States, 25(2) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99-100
(2003).
:5 UCITA, supra note 13, Prefatory Note.
16 The principle of "self-help" generally allows software developers to embed "logic bombs" in
software that terminate the operation of the program in order to facilitate control of the use of software
post-sale and to ensure that payment terms are met. Szwak, supra note 1, at 39-40.
17 On August 1, 2003, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) discharged the standby committee of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act at
its 112th Annual Meeting in Washington, DC. See Press Release, Uniform Law Commissioners, UCITA
Standby Committee is Discharged (Aug. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemlD=56 (last visited May 21, 2004).
The UCITA had encountered strong resistance from various consumer interest groups, the Federal Trade
Commission, states' Attorneys General and the American Bar Association. The Act's passage into law was
defeated in numerous states and was only accepted in Virginia and Maryland. See Americans for Fair
Electronic Commerce Transactions, History of the UCITA, available at
http://www.ucita.com/whathistory.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
IS Jacques De Werra, Moving Beyond the Conflict Between Freedom of Contract and Policies. In
Search of a New Global Policy for On-line Information Licensing Transaction, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
239, 295-96 (2003). De Werra further highlights that the UCITA is a "likely candidate to become a model
of regulation for global electronic commerce transactions." Id. at 295.
'9 See UCITA, supra note 13, § 110, cmt. 1.
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purchaser that by removing the shrink-wrap from the box, the purchaser
assents to the terms of the enclosed license. Opponents of shrink-wrap
agreements argue that such licenses purport to bind users to terms that they
cannot read prior to sale. However, this Article illustrates that U.S. courts
are unlikely to enforce a shrink-wrap license that the user has not had a prior
opportunity to read unless the licensor provides a grace period for the return
of the software if the user finds the license terms unacceptable.
In the United States, two conflicting lines of authority exist in relation
to the enforceability of shrink-wrap contracts. In Step-Saver Data Systems v.
Wyse Technology,20 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned
that a shrink-wrap form is a proposal for additional terms made subsequent
to contract formation. Under this approach, a shrink-wrap agreement is
unenforceable because business-to-consumer contracts require specific
assent to the new terms, and business-to-business contracts require specific
21assent to new terms that materially alter the agreement. On the other hand,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided a forceful
economic rationale for the enforcement of shrink-wrap agreements in
ProCD v. Zeidenberg.22  The court reasoned that the use of a shrink-wrap
agreement in a software transaction is no different from any other "buy now,
terms later" transaction such as an airline ticket, a contract for insurance, or
a warranty agreement, which are uniformly enforced.23  As a result, the
contract is concluded not when the purchase money is paid, but when the
2 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cit. 1991). See also Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan.
2000), Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
21 U.C.C. § 2-207 subsections (1) and (2) provide that:
[a] definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is
sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon. . . [t]he additional terms
are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such
terms become part of the contract unless... they materially alter it (emphasis added).
Although the appropriateness of applying the U.C.C. Art. 2-primarily a "sale of goods" law-to
information transactions has been questioned, it has been judicially noted that courts have applied and will
continue to apply the U.C.C. to software transactions because that is what the parties reasonably expect.
I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002).
22 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997);
O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003); Westendorfv. Gateway 2000, Inc., 41
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1110 (Del. Ch. 2000); Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1143 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1999); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1060 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Brower
v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson v. Timberline Software
Corp., 140 Wn.2d 568 (Wash. 2000).
23 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
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consumer assents to the terms by not returning the product in the grace
period provided in the contract.24
The ProCD approach to shrink-wrap agreements has proven the most
influential. 25 This influence is due to the forceful economic reasoning that
underlies it. Simply put, the Step-Saver approach makes it difficult to
introduce standard terms into mass-market transactions. Under the Step-
Saver approach, the only way to incorporate such terms is by asking the
purchaser for a signature, or by providing the purchaser with actual notice of
the terms, at the time of sale. The drawbacks of such a requirement are
illustrated by the detrimental effect the Step-Saver approach would have on
the operation of warranties accompanying consumer goods. Under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,26 a written limited warranty can limit the
implied warranty of merchantability-that a good is fit for its ordinary
purpose-to the duration of the limited warranty. 27  The Step-Saver
approach would require all retailers to orally inform the consumer at the
time of the purchase that the implied warranty of merchantability was
limited by duration; otherwise, the limited warranty is an unassented
proposal for varying the agreement.28 In the absence of this express oral
warning, the retailer would be bound by the duration of the implied warranty
of merchantability for as long as state law statutes of limitation allow an
action. 29  The result would be that implied statutory warranties would
generally trump contractually based warranties.
In ProCD, the court noted the absurdity of the above position, stating
that "no state disregards warranties furnished with consumer products" and
that the Step-Saver reasoning in consumer contracts would mean that the
seller makes "a broad warranty and must pay consequential damages for any
shortfalls in performance, two 'promises' that if taken seriously would drive
24 Id. at 1452-53.
25 The author is aware of only one case since ProCD that declined to follow that opinion by holding
a shrink-wrap license agreement void against the user for want of proper agreement. See Klocek, 104 F.
Supp. 2d at 1332. In Sofinan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1087-88 (C.D.
Cal. 2001), the court indicated that a shrink-wrap agreement, unlike a click-wrap agreement, may not bind
the parties, due to lack of true assent. However, these comments must be treated with caution as the case
involved the question of whether a distributor, as opposed to a user, is bound by a shrink-wrap license.
26 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 (2003).
27 Id. § 2308(b).
28 Without incorporation of the disclaimer either orally or by the signature of a standard form at the
time of sale, the customer does not see the warranty disclaimer until after the conclusion of the sale.
29 The limitation period for an action arising under a breach of express or implied warranty is, in
most states, four years after the purchase date. See Federal Trade Commission, A Businessperson's Guide
to Federal Warranty Law, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/warranty.htm (last
visited May 21, 2004).
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prices through the ceiling or return transactions to the horse-and-buggy
age."3°
While there seems to be broad judicial acceptance that shrink-wrap
agreements should be enforced like any other standard form contract,
circumstances do exist, especially between merchants, where such a
document will not be binding under U.S. law. For example, if the supplier
receives notice that the buyer does not wish to comply with the license but
nonetheless continues to proceed with the sale, § 2-207 of the U.C.C. will
apply. 31 The facts of Step-Saver relate precisely to this scenario. In Step-
Saver, the defendant had sold the plaintiff software on numerous prior
occasions. Throughout their business relationship, the plaintiffs president
had repeatedly objected to the box-top license terms and twice refused to
32
sign agreements that would formalize the terms of the license. Despite this
notice, the supplier continued to sell the software to the plaintiff.
Consequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied § 2-
207 of the U.C.C. and excluded the license from governing the transaction.
Thus, the enforceability of shrink-wrap agreements is fact-dependant. In
consumer cases, where there is an isolated sale and the purchaser is aware at
the time of sale that the sale is governed by a shrink-wrap license, a U.S.
court is likely to apply the ProCD rationale and hold the license terms prima
facie enforceable. However, between merchants, in cases of a true "battle of
the forms," a shrink-wrap agreement will be unenforceable if a supplier
proceeds with the sale despite the purchaser providing notice that it does not
intend to be bound by the license.
b. Click-wrap agreements
Click-wrap agreements present their terms on a digital display and are
characterized by an "I Agree" button that the user clicks to indicate assent to
the terms. The "I Agree" button is closely proximate to the terms and the
user will generally be unable to complete the transaction unless the "I
30 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451-52.
31 U.C.C. § 2-207(3) provides that conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract. In Step-Saver, the court stated that "[w]hen the parties" conduct establishes a contract,
but the parties have failed to adopt expressly a particular writing as the terms of their agreement, and the
writings exchanged by the parties do not agree, U.C.C. § 2-207 determines the terms of the contract." Step-
Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991). Thus, if the overall transaction
is not revoked by the licensor upon receiving notice of explicit rejection of the license by the licensee,
U.C.C. § 2-207 provides that there is a contract despite the written license term that requires return of the
software in the event of the licensee rejecting the terms.
32 Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 102-03.
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Agree" button is clicked. Originally, the click-wrap format was a type of
EULA that was presented to a software licensee during software installation.
Unless assent was indicated, the licensee could not install the program.
However, the click-wrap format is now widely used in the sale of goods and
services online and has thus become an important means by which standard
form contracts are entered into over the Internet.
In the United States, no case has yet limited the enforceability of
click-wrap contracts for want of true assent.33 This could be due to the fact
that such agreements generally require an unequivocal positive act: clicking
an "I Agree" button on a software program or webpage, as opposed to the
assent by omission in shrink-wrap agreements. Furthermore, one case
suggests that use of a click-wrap agreement precludes the possibility of a
party's reliance on U.C.C. § 2-207 to exclude an unwanted EULA
provision.34
In ILAN v. Netscout,35 the court reasoned that clicking an "I Agree"
button was explicit acceptance sufficient for the inclusion of new material
terms under U.C.C. § 2-207.36 The defendant, Netscout, sold software that
monitored network usage and the plaintiff, i.LAN, sold network-monitoring
services. i.LAN entered into a value-added reseller agreement whereby it
could rent Netscout's software to customers.37 In claiming that their
damages were not contractually limited, i.LAN tried to rely on the purchase
order-which contained no limitations of liability-as the basis of the
agreement. 38 i.LAN argued that the Step-Saver reasoning should apply to
the click-wrap EULA in order to exclude the operation of a limited liability
clause contained in the click-wrap agreement. The court rejected this
argument, noting that every time i.LAN installed the software on a client's
33 For cases addressing the validity of click-wrap agreements, see Forest v. Verizon
Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2002); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson 89 F.3d 1257 (6th
Cir. 1996); DeJohn v. The TV Corp., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. 111. 2003); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F.
Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D.
Mass. 2002); Lieschke v. Real Networks, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1683 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000); Koch
v. America Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690 (D. Md. 2000); Kilgallen v. Network Solutions, Inc., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2000); Hotmail Corp. v. Vans Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
16, 1998); 1-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., 2003 Mass. App. Div 30 (Mass. App. Div. 2003); Caspi v.
Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Groffv. America Online, Inc.,
1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex.
App. 2001).
34 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35 183 F. Supp. 2d 328.
36 Id. at 338.
37 Id. at 330.
3 id.
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computer, i.Lan explicitly accepted the terms of the click-wrap by clicking
the "I Agree" button.
c. Browse-wrap agreements
Browse-wrap agreements are similar to shrink-wrap agreements in
that they rely on acceptance by conduct to bind the user. The conduct
indicative of assent in browse-wrap agreements is the licensee making use of
a website in some way. Some browse-wraps purport to bind the user upon
merely visiting the site, while others require more positive acts, such as the
submission of a database query or the download of a particular file.
Typically, the terms and conditions of a browse-wrap are accessible via a
"terms and conditions" link on the homepage. Unlike click-wrap
agreements, browse-wrap licensees are not forced to click on an "I Agree"
button proximate to the terms in order to access the desired information.
Rather, the licensee can access the information without being exposed to the
terms. It is this lack of proximity between use of the contracted service and
display of the terms that makes browse-wrap agreements vulnerable to
impeachment for lack of assent.
U.S. courts appear more hostile to browse-wrap agreements than other
wrap agreements. The reported cases indicate the enforcement of browse-
wraps in the United States is highly fact-specific. The enforceability of a
browse-wrap agreement will likely turn upon whether the user was
reasonably aware of, and had an opportunity to review, the terms and
conditions prior to the transaction. In Specht v. Netscape,39 and
40Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com,4 0 browse-wrap agreements failed for lack of
assent in the circumstances. However, a browse-wrap agreement managed
to survive a motion to dismiss in PollStar v. Gigimania,4' where District
Judge Coyle stated:
39 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002). In Specht, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit refused to
enforce an arbitration clause contained within'a browse-wrap agreement. The browse-wrap agreement was
found behind a link that stated "Please review and agree to the terms of the Netscape SmartDownload
software license agreement before downloading and using the software." Id. at 23. This link was located at
the bottom of the download page such that the user had to scroll-down the webpage to view it. Id. The
download link, however, was located at the top of the page and made no reference to any terms and
conditions governing the download. The court concluded that the link was not readily apparent to users
and that under the circumstances the user could hardly have assented to the arbitration clause. Id. at 32.
40 No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000). In Ticketmaster, the breach of
contract claim was dismissed as lacking "sufficient proof of agreement." Id.
41 170 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000).
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While the court agrees with Gigimania that the user is not
immediately confronted with the notice of the license
agreement, this does not dispose of Pollstar's breach of contract
claim. The court hesitates to declare the invalidity and
unenforceability of the browse wrap license agreement at this
time. Taking into consideration the examples provided by the
[ProCD court]-showing that people sometimes enter into a
contract by using a service without first seeing the terms-the
browser wrap license agreement may be arguably valid and
enforceable.4
However, Gigimania's interlocutory nature provides a somewhat
shakier foundation to support browse-wrap agreements, especially due to the
reservations expressed by the court in relation to the inadequacy of the
notice of the terms and conditions.4 3  Register.com v. Verio44 provides
stronger support for the enforcement of browse-wrap agreements in
circumstances where the license terms are prominent on the website.45
Manifestation of assent will be very difficult to prove where a
software distributor or online service provider solely uses a browse-wrap
agreement to govern its on-line dealings. The scant authority available
provides little clarification as to the circumstances that will allow
enforcement of a browse-wrap agreement. The UCITA, which is discussed
below, was an attempt to clarify the circumstances under which a browse-
wrap contract may be enforced.
2. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
The UCITA provisions on agreement in standard form EULAs are a
clear reflection of the post-ProCD U.S. case law. As in ProCD, the "right to
42 Id. at 982.
13 Id. at 981. The court indicated that the user may not be fully aware of the terms and conditions
because the notice was "in small gray print on a gray background" [sic] and the link was not underlined,
which is the usual way of distinguishing text links from other text. Id.
" 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D. N.Y. 2000), aff'd, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
45 In Register.corn, the district court enjoined a defendant from extracting data from a WHOIS
database for commercial purposes. Id. at 238. A clause in Register.com's browse-wrap for the WHOIS
database stated that the identification and contact details contained within the database could not be used
for the purposes of mass unsolicited commercial advertising. Id. at 242. Verio extracted the information
for that purpose. This clause was displayed every time a WHOIS query was submitted. Id. at 248.
Consequently, Verio could not argue that it was unaware of the terms and only argued that it did not
manifest assent by a positive affirmation-that is, a click of the mouse. Id. The court noted that the terms
and conditions were clearly posted and that the act of submitting the WHOIS enquiry was clearly indicated
as the method of acceptance. Id.
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a return" is a fundamental requirement if the licensor is solely using a
shrink-wrap agreement that precludes the licensee from having an
opportunity to review the terms before purchase. 6 The right to return can be
avoided altogether if the vendor trades over the Internet and gives the
purchaser an opportunity to review the license terms before sale.47 Section
211, which clarifies the "opportunity to review" requirement in relation to
Internet-based transactions, validates the use of click-wrap agreements in
online ordering processes. An opportunity to review is provided if the
supplier:
(1) makes the standard terms of the license readily available
for review by the licensee before the information is
delivered or the licensee becomes obligated to pay,
whichever occurs first, by:
(A) displaying prominently and in close proximity to a
description of the computer information, or to
instructions or steps for acquiring it, the standard
terms or a reference to an electronic location from
which they can be readily obtained; or
(B) disclosing the availability of the standard terms in
a prominent place on the site from which the
computer information is offered and promptly
furnishing a copy of the standard terms on request
before the transfer of the computer information;
and
(2) does not take affirmative acts to prevent printing or storage of
the standard terms for archival or review purposes by the
licensee.41
In addition to validating click-wrap agreements, UCITA § 211 also
provides clearer guidance than the common law and the U.C.C. as to what
circumstances allow enforcement of browse-wrap agreements. It seems that
46 If the license is presented only after payment and delivery, UCITA § 112(e)(3) provides that there
must be a "right to a return" the software if the purchaser rejects the terms of the agreement.
47 UCITA, supra note 13, § 108 provides that a party adopts the terms of a standard form contract by
manifesting assent. UCITA § 112(a) provides that manifestation of assent can be explicit or implicit after
there is "opportunity to review" the terms.
48 Id. §211 (emphasis added).
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to maximize the possibility of enforcing a browse-wrap agreement, a
website's terms and conditions link must indeed be prominent-a no
nonsense, "in your face" link-that could prove to be, aesthetically
speaking, an ugly option for website proprietors. The official comment to
the UCITA indicates that the requirement of proximity is to ensure that the
reasonable person would have sufficient notice of the terms. Furthermore,
the link must also be proximate to the transaction. For example, a prominent
terms and conditions link on a home page may not effectively govern the use
of distributed software if the download page omits that link.
Despite the UCITA's acceptance of some browse-wrap agreements,
this proposed law provides little protection to vendors. Given the UCITA's
tenuous status, online goods and service providers would be prudent to use
click-wrap agreements in the course of every online transaction they wish to
govern contractually.
B. Australian Law's Capacity to Enforce EULAs
There is no direct authority on the enforceability of EULAs in
Australian law.49  This section argues, however, that Australian courts
should enforce shrink-wrap, click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements where
the purchaser has had a reasonable opportunity to review the terms prior to
assuming binding obligations. There is nothing inherent in EULAs that
warrants different treatment from other types of mass-market standard form
contracts. Just as U.S. courts have found that there is no difference between
EULAs and other "buy now, terms later" contracts, Australian courts may
employ legally analogous contracts to enforce wrap agreements.
Specifically, Anglo-Australian cases addressing the enforceability of ticket
terms could be employed in the context of wrap contracts. To do otherwise
would be to take legal doctrine a step backward by implying that the only
method of concluding a written contract would be by signature or by explicit
oral recitation of the terms prior to the time of sale. The weight of authority
in the ticket cases strongly suggests that Australian law is adequately
prepared to deal with a EULA should a court be faced with the question of
its enforceability.
49 While a Scottish case upheld the enforceability of a licensee's "right to return" against the
distributor in a software manufacturer's shrink-wrap agreement, the case depended on a Scottish exception
to the doctrine of privity-ius quaesitum tertio--that is not yet applicable in Australian law. Beta
Computers (Europe) Ltd. v. Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd. [1996] S.C.L.R. 587. The licensee's "right to
return" refers to a standard shrink-wrap clause, which provides a grace period after the purchase of the
software, but before the license becomes binding, where the licensee can return the software if they find the
terms of the license objectionable.
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There are, however, two features of Australian contract law that pose
obstacles to the enforceability of EULAs. Firstly, Australian courts require
"special notice" for "onerous terms." Unfortunately, Australian courts'
current articulation of this rule is inexact, forcing licensors to formulate their
own conclusion as to which contractual terms are onerous. The consequent
unpredictability is highly unfair to licensors and leads to increased litigation
costs. To provide certainty in this area of law, the Australian legislature
should follow the United States, which has clearly identified when and how
special notice is required.
Secondly, the doctrine of privity may prevent the enforceability of
EULAs. The doctrine of privity provides that only when a software
company sells direct to the licensee will the licensee be bound. To give their
EULAs any effect, software companies are forced to either not use resellers,
or make their resellers enter into complex agency agreements. This
complication could have a chilling effect on software distribution in
Australia. As shown below, Australian adherence to the privity doctrine is
out of touch with the position in the United States and the United Kingdom
and must be abolished by the legislature.
1. Australian Ticket Cases: A Close Legal Analogy to US. EULA Law
The Anglo-Australian case law determining the enforceability of
contractual terms written on tickets bears a striking similarity to Judge
Easterbrook's analysis of a shrink-wrap agreement in ProCD. This
similarity is based on the legal construction at the time of formation; the
issuance of the ticket is an offer that is accepted when the purchaser does not
reject the ticket after having a reasonable opportunity to read its terms.
The Anglo-Australian ticket cases provide that for a statement of
terms to be incorporated this way, first, reasonable notice of the terms must
be given and, second, there must be a reasonable opportunity to review and
reject the terms prior to the formation of binding obligations.50 If applied to
EULAs, this rule has the same effect as the assent provisions of the UCITA;
the licensor must provide the licensee with a reasonable opportunity to
review the terms before any purported conduct can indicate acceptance.
Consequently, a right of return is required if the opportunity to review
50 CARTER & HARLAND, supra note 9, at 210. Reasonable notice encompasses the notion that the
recipient must be aware that the contract handed to him contains terms and conditions. Causer v. Browne
(1952) V.L.R. 1, 5 (Austl.). This notice is determined objectively by ascertaining whether it would be
obvious to the reasonably prudent recipient that the document contained the terms and conditions. Parker
v. South Eastern Railway Co. (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416,429 (United Kingdom).
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occurs post-sale. While this close legal parallel between U.S. law regarding
EULAs and the law expounded in the Anglo-Australian ticket cases
indicates that EULAs should be enforceable under Australian law, the later
ticket cases have added a further requirement that makes matters less certain
for software licensors.
2. Special Notice for Onerous Terms: An Ambiguous Legal Requirement
Later Anglo-Australian ticket cases introduced the requirement that
where a ticket includes onerous terms, "special notice" must be made to
bring these terms to the attention of the other party. Unfortunately, the cases
do not elaborate upon what constitutes an onerous term. In Thornton v. Shoe
Lane Parking,51 the objectionable term excluded liability for personal injury
due to the service provider's negligent acts.52 All three judges held that this
term required special notice. One judge considered it a term "so wide and so
destructive of the plaintiffs' rights",53 another regarded it as "unusual ' 4 and
the third spoke in terms of it being stringent.55 In Interfoto Picture Library
v. Stiletto Visual Programmes,5 6 the invalidated term applied "steep" late
fees for failing to return borrowed photographs by the due date and was in
substance a penalty clause.57 One judge noted that special notice should be
given to "onerous or unusual" terms,58 and the other judge spoke in terms of
the extent to which they were not "common form or usual terms regularly
encountered in the business." 59
Likewise, the special notice that is required for an onerous term may
be equally difficult to quantify. In Thornton, Lord Denning provided what
seems to be the sole dicta clarifying this requirement when he stated that
such a term must be brought to the attention of the other in the "most explicit
way". 60 For instance, "[i]n order to give sufficient notice, [the term] would
need to be printed in red with a red hand pointing to it--or something
equally startling.",6'
51 (1971) 2 Q.B. 163 (United Kingdom).
52 Id. at 167-68.
53 Id. at 170 (Denning, M.R.).
5' ld. at 172 (Megaw, L.J.).
55 Id. at 174 (Sir Gordon Wilmer).
5' (1989) Q.B. 433 (United Kingdom).
" Id. at 436.
51 Id. at 439 (Dillion, L.J.).
59 Id. at 445 (Binham, L.J.).
60 Thornton, (1971) 2 Q.B. at 170.
61 Id. This dicta was cited approvingly in Interfoto [1989] Q.B. at 437 (Dillon, L.J.).
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In contrast, U.S. law provides much clearer guidance in relation to
when special notice must be given and what type of notice is required.
Under the U.C.C., contractual clauses purporting to disclaim the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness are required to be "conspicuous".
62
The UCITA similarly requires conspicuous documentation of terms that
disclaim implied warranties,63 terms that prohibit the re-sale of the license,64
and terms that "opt-out" of the UCITA as the governing law of the
contract.65 However, the UCITA goes further than the U.C.C., providing
that in order to be enforced, a term need not be conspicuous unless the
UCITA expressly so requires.
66
Both the UCITA and U.C.C. provide that a conspicuous term is one
presented in such a manner that a reasonable person ought to have noticed
it.67  The UCITA provides the following non-exclusive definition of a
conspicuous term:
(i) a heading in capitals in a size equal to or greater than, or
in contrasting type, font, or color to, the surrounding text;
(ii) language in the body of a record or display in larger or
other contrasting type, font, or color or set off from the
surrounding text by symbols or other marks that draw
attention to the language; and
(iii) a term prominently referenced in an electronic record or
display which is readily accessible or reviewable from
the record or display.6'
The clear guidance provided by the U.C.C. and UCITA as to what
terms require special notice is invaluable to the licensor and should be
adopted in Australia. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine
what kinds of terms should be given special notice, and what form this
notice should take, certainty and predictability in this area is required.
Under Australian law, software companies and online service providers
simply do not know when special notice is required. While this conclusion
6'2 U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
63 UCITA, supra note 13, § 406(1-3).
6 Id. § 503(4).
61 Id. § 104(3).
6 Id. § 106(d). However, the UCITA subordinates itself to state consumer protections statues that
may require other terms be conspicuous. Id. § 105(c).
67 U.C.C. § 1-201(10); UCITA, supra note 13, § 102(14).
68 UCITA, supra note 13, § 102(14). U.C.C. § 1-201(10) and UCITA, supra note 13, § 102, cmt. 12,
provide that the question of conspicuousness is a judgment to be made by the court having regard to all the
circumstances of the case.
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may be obvious in respect of exclusion clauses and penalty clauses, there are
other contentious terms that could arguably fall into the onerous category.
Potentially onerous terms could include exclusive jurisdiction clauses,
binding arbitration clauses, and anti-reverse engineering clauses.
The lack of legal certainty regarding onerous terms also makes it easy
for a judge to apply his or her own values regarding what terms require
special notice in standard form contracts. For example, an Australian court
could find a foreign jurisdiction clause onerous in the consumer context if it
required the consumer to travel half-way around the world to litigate a small
sum. However, a court could also find this requirement valid on the basis
that such a term is ordinarily used in every standard form contract entered
into over the Internet. Unless licensors make every term that substantively
affects the licensee's legal rights "conspicuous," there is no principled way
of guaranteeing compliance with Australia's special notice rule. To avoid
arbitrariness and uncertainty, Australian law should follow the United
States' clear articulation of when and how terms must be displayed
conspicuously. The prescriptive aspect of this legal development makes the
change more amenable to legislative intervention by parliament than judicial
pronouncement.
3. The Privity Doctrine: An Anachronistic Impediment to Wrap
Agreements
The doctrine of privity represents a second formidable obstacle to the
enforceability of EULAs under Australian law. Under the privity doctrine,
only a person who has provided consideration, and is therefore a partY to the
contract, can judicially enforce those contractual terms in court. 9 The
doctrine of privity has been widely criticized as unjust because it can work
against the obvious intentions of the parties where they intend to benefit a
third party.7° It allows unscrupulous parties to break the contract, knowing
that the third party beneficiary cannot sue. While U.S. law has long
recognized the right of third party beneficiaries to sue on a promise intended
for their benefit, this reform is only recent in the United Kingdom,72 and
has yet to be implemented in Australia.
69 Coulls v. Bagot's Executor and Trustee Co. (1967) 119 C.L.R. 460, 494-8 (Austl.) (Windeyer, J.).
70 Trident Gen. Ins. Co. v. McNeice Bros. (1988) 165 C.L.R. 107, 116-8 (Austl.).
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, ch. 14 (1981).
72 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, § 1 (Eng.).
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Privity has been described the "most significant legal barrier to the
enforceability of software licenses under Australian law. 73  Under the
doctrine of privity, unless a software company directly sells its goods to the
licensee, the software company is not considered a party to the contract, and
therefore cannot enforce any provisions therein in litigation with the
licensee. To enforce its information rights, the software company must rely
exclusively upon the concepts of intellectual property law. Warranty
disclaimers, limitations of liability, and jurisdiction clauses in wrap
agreements are all rendered useless. Due to the Australian adherence to
privity, one writer has cast the possibility of the software manufacturer's
terms actually being incorporated into the contract with the licensee as
4C', 74
"rather remote".
It may be arguable that on the basis of a 1988 Australian High Court
decision that the privity doctrine may not in fact render software licenses
unenforceable. In Trident General Insurance v. McNeice Brothers,75 it was
recognized by all seven judges of the High Court that the privity doctrine
can cause substantial injustices. Three of the seven justices agreed that in
contracts of public liability insurance, the injustice caused by adherence to
the doctrine of privity clearly precipitated the need to abolish the doctrine.76
While the three justices sought to confine their decision to the context of
third party beneficiaries under public liability insurance policies, it was
recognized that the decision may have an impact on other forms of
contract.77 While privity may provide a legal reason for a judge to deny the
software maker the benefit of a EULA provision, the judicial hostility to
privity expressed by the High Court in Trident may well provide a vehicle
for a lower court judge to decide the other way.78
Despite the strong judicial hostility to privity evidenced in Trident,
without legislative action, the privity doctrine presents a barrier to the
enforceability of EULAs where there is no direct sales contract between the
licensor and the licensee. Two justices noted in Trident that privity is so
entrenched in Australian law that only an act of parliament could abolish it.
79
73 David Lindsay, Copyright, Contract and Mass Market Agreements, (2002), available at
http://www.copyright.com.au/reports.htm (last visited May 21, 2004).
7 J.W. Carter, Article 2B: International Perspectives, 14 J. CONT. L. 54, 67 (1999), available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/carter.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
7 (1988) 165 CLR 107.
76 Mason, CJ, Wilson and Toohey, JJ. Deane and Gaudron, JJ. proceeded on a different doctrinal
basis, deciding in favor of the third party.
' Trident (1988) 165 CLR at 171-72 (Toohey, J.).
78 Carter and Harland note that, due to Trident, the doctrine of privity in Australia is in a "state of
flux". CARTER & HARLAND, supra note 9, at 340.
79 Trident (1988) 165 CLR at 125-142 (Brennan, J.). Id. at 155-162 (Dawson, J.).
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The Australian legislature should respond to the invitation in Trident
to reform the privity doctrine. The legislature is better suited than the
judiciary to select between the numerous policy choices that such a reform
would require.80 Until such reform takes place the status of shrink-wrap and
click-wrap EULAs in Australia remains-just like the status of the doctrine
of privity itself-unacceptably uncertain.
III. EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION CLAUSES AND BINDING ARBITRATION
CONTRACTS IN EULAs AND ONLINE SERVICE AGREEMENTS
If Australian courts recognise the enforceability of EULAs and online
service agreements, they must further determine the enforceability of typical
terms found within such agreements. Some of these terms already have
legislation or judicial precedent that qualifies or prohibits their use.81
However, the digital age has necessitated other controversial clauses within
EULAs that have not yet been addressed by remedial legislation. A good
example of a new type of clause that has emerged in EULAs is a clause that
prohibits uses of copyright information that would otherwise be legal under
copyright law.8 2 Other types of clauses to rise in significance are exclusive
jurisdiction clauses and binding arbitration clauses. While merchants have
used these clauses for centuries to facilitate predictable dispute resolution,
their use by online traders to hedge the risk of exposure to numerous
jurisdictions has become most controversial in recent years, especially in the
consumer context.
This Part focuses on the enforceability of exclusive jurisdiction
clauses and binding arbitration clauses in EULAs and online services
agreements under U.S., E.U., and Australian law. These controversial
clauses are by far the most litigated clauses in U.S. EULA litigation over the
past ten years.8 3  When a EULA eventually comes before an Australian
'0 For a good summary of the policy considerations involved see id. at 162 (Dawson, J.).
81 A notable example is the prohibition of certain limitations of liability in consumer contracts. For
example, Section 68 and 68A of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Austl., CTH) prohibit all exclusion clauses
in consumer contracts that limit liability for consequential and incidental loss of a breach of an implied
warranty due to the good or service provider's negligence. U.C.C. § 2-719 also provides that "[l]imitation
of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable."
2 For an illustration of these types of terms see Copyright Law Review Committee, Copyright and
Contract App. E, available at http://www.law.gov.au/www/clrHome.nsf/AllDocs/C3D3380F891
CIDClCA256C4FO00BDFAB?OpenDocument OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 30, 2004). Some terms
purport to prohibit quotation for the purpose of criticism, prohibit reverse engineering for the purposes of
interoperability and prohibit the re-sale of software. See id.
3 Binding arbitration clauses were an issue in a number of cases. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape
Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997);
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past ten years.8 3 When a EULA eventually comes before an Australian
court, it is highly likely that enforcement of the dispute resolution clause will
similarly be an issue.
U.S., E.U., and Australian law adopt different approaches to exclusive
jurisdiction and binding arbitration clauses. The U.S. approach to such
clauses emphasizes freedom of contract, the E.U. approach emphasizes
consumer protection, while the Australian approach emphasizes judicial
discretion. Of the three approaches, Australia is unquestionably the most
unwelcoming toward contractual forum selection. This section argues that
Australian law should abandon the outdated discretionary approach to the
enforcement of exclusive jurisdiction clauses and adopt the E.U. approach,
which provides mandatory enforcement at the business-to-business level,
while creating a consumer's right to sue in his or her home state. In relation
to binding arbitration clauses at the consumer level, Australia should ignore
the extreme positions taken by the United States and European Union and go
83 Binding arbitration clauses were an issue in a number of cases. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape
Comm. Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997);
O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003); Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d
1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Lieschke v. Real Networks, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1683 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10,
2000); Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F.
Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998); Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 2000 WL 307369 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16,
2000); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL 823611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 12, 1997); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
Exclusive jurisdiction clauses were considered in the following cases: Forest v. Verizon
Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2002); DeJohn v. The TV Corp., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913
(C.D. I11. 2003); Koch v. America Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690 (D. Md. 2000); Kilgallen v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2000); America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda
County, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); America Online Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Mgmt Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Const. Inc., 743 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999); I-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 30 (Mass. App. Div. 2003); Williams
v. America Online, Inc., 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1101 (Mass. Super. 2001); Caspi v. Microsoft Network,
732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Groff v. America Online, 1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super.
May 27, 1998); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App. 2001).
Warranty disclaimers and other limitations on liability were considered in the following cases:
Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc., v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991); I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout
Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2002); Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v.
Synchronics, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Ariz. Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link Inc., 831 F.
Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993); Rinaldi v. Iomega, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d 1143 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999); M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 140 Wn.2d 568 (Wash. 2000).
Clauses that purported to prohibit the commercial use of factual information in a database were
considered in the following cases: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Ticketmaster
Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug 10, 2000); PollStar v. Gigimania Ltd., 170 F.
Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000); Register.corn, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
In Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) the clause
at issue purported to ban the defendants from using the plaintiff's "web-mail" facility to send spam. The
clause at issue in Softman Prods. v. Adobe Sys., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) restricted the
circumstances in which the software could be re-sold. In Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317
(Fed. Cir. 2003), the clause at issue prohibited reverse engineering of the licensed software.
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its own way. Courts should advocate and emphasize the use of fair
arbitration procedures. Instead of refusing to enforce an unfair arbitration
clause, Australian courts should be empowered to rewrite arbitration clauses
to reach a fair outcome.
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses
1. Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in the United States: Advancing a
Strong Enforcement Policy
a. US. common law position
U.S. law has developed a strong enforcement policy in relation to
exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Formerly, U.S. courts considered exclusive
jurisdiction clauses violative of public policy because these clauses
purported to oust the authority of all courts other than those identified in the
contract8 4  This hostility has been withdrawn in light of the realities of
international trade and commerce, which require predictability and neutrality
in dispute resolution.85
In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, 6 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that forum selection clauses are presumptively valid and should be enforced
unless shown to be unreasonable under the circumstances. 87 Although the
Court did not precisely determine what constituted an "unreasonable" forum
selection clause, it suggested that a stay would be denied where: (1)
enforcement would violate a strong public policy of the forum in which the
dispute is brought;88 (2) the chosen forum is "so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that [the plaintiff] will for all practical purposes be deprived of
his day in court";89 or (3) the clause is invalid for reasons such as fraud,
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power.90 The Court stated that
4 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
85 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that such clauses are "an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international transaction." Scherk v.
Alberto-Culiver, 417 U.S. 506, 507 (1974).
86 407 U.S. 1. The Bremen concerned a London jurisdiction clause in a contract for the long distance
ocean towing of an oilrig. The contract was the result of free bargaining between two well-resourced
parties. Id.
7 Id. at 10.
8 Id. at 15.
89 Id. at 18.
9' Id. at 15.
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serious inconvenience would very difficult to establish in a freely bargained-
for jurisdiction clause. 91
The strong enforcement policy espoused in The Bremen was
eventually extended to consumer contracts and now applies with equal force
in both the business-to-business and business-to-consumer contexts. In the
immediate wake of The Bremen, numerous lower court decisions confined
the case's operation to freely negotiated contracts.92 The Supreme Court, in
a widely criticized decision,93 applied the Bremen approach to a standard
form agreement in the consumer context. In Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute,94 the plaintiffs suffered injury on a cruise ship off the coast of
Mexico. 95 The passenger ticket stipulated that all disputes relating to the
voyage were to be adjudicated in Florida, where the defendant had its
principal place of business. 96 When the plaintiffs sued in Washington-their
home state-the trial court dismissed the action on a forum non conveniens
basis. Although the court of appeals reversed the district court,97 the
Supreme Court upheld the lower court dismissal, holding the exclusive
jurisdiction clause enforceable. The Supreme Court held that the Shutes had
not discharged their "heavy burden of proof' required to demonstrate
inconvenience under the Bremen test. The Court noted that Florida was not
a "remote alien forum" and that the dispute was not more amenable to
litigation in Washington rather than Florida.9 8 Although the Court stated
that forum selection clauses in standard form passage contracts were subject
to additional scrutiny for fairness, there was no bad-faith on part of the
defendant by selecting the forum where their business was primarily based.99
In Carnival, the Supreme Court decided that a jurisdiction clause that
designates a party's home state as the venue for litigation in a standard form
9' Id. at 16.
92 GARY BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 245
(2d ed. 1994).
9' See, e.g., Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 700 (1992) and Edward A. Purcell, Jr.,
Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40
UCLA L. REV. 423 (1992).
"4 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
9' Id. at 588.
96 Id. at 587-88.
97 Id. at 588. The court of appeals reversed the decision holding that: (1) a standard form jurisdiction
clause was unenforceable because it was not freely bargained for; and (2) there was "evidence in the record
to indicate that the Shutes are physically and financially incapable of pursuing [the] litigation in Florida."
Id. at 589 (internal quotations omitted).
9' Id. at 594.
99 Id. at 595.
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passage contract is generally reasonable. 00  To support this decision, the
Court provided a number of economic rationales. First, a carrier has a
legitimate interest in limiting the potential venues where it can be sued.'0'
Second, a forum selection clause provides predictability in dispute
resolution, reducing the time and expense involved in pre-trial jurisdiction
litigation.10 2 Third, the Court noted that it is likely that the costs saved by
the jurisdiction clause would be passed on to consumers by way of reduced
fares.
03
U.S. courts have liberally applied the Bremen test in the context of
shrink-wrap and click-wrap agreements. °4 In consumer contexts, U.S.
courts generally enforce jurisdiction clauses, suggesting that the burden of
proof to establish inconvenience is indeed "heavy."' 1 5 The cases illustrate
that forum selection clauses designating the software manufacturer's or
online service provider's home state as the venue for litigation are prima
facie reasonable and will generally be enforced.
U.S. courts' propensity to enforce jurisdiction clauses within wrap
agreements is vividly illustrated in litigation determining whether a
jurisdiction clause can be used to effectively hedge the risk of consumer
class actions. Specifically, a number of shrink-wrap and click-wrap cases
involve challenges to forum clauses of Virginia companies that select
Virginia as the proper venue for litigation. Virginia is one of the only two
states that do not allow class action suits.'06  The majority of courts have
a"0 Id. at 593.
101 Id.
2 d. at 593-94.
1o3 Id. at 594.
Forum selection clauses were enforced in a number of cases. See Forest v. Verizon Comm. Inc.,
805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2002); DeJohn v. The .TV Corp., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Koch v.
America Online, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 690 (D. Md. 2000); Kilgallen v. Network Solutions, Inc., 99 F.
Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2000); America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001);
Management Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Const., Inc., 743 So.2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (applying the forum clause only to contract claims, not to the statutory claims, which were
severable); I-A Equip. Co. v. Icode, Inc., 2003 Mass. App. Div. 30 (Mass. App. Div. 2003); Caspi v.
Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Groff v. America Online, Inc., 1998
WL 307001 (R.I. Super., May 27, 1998); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200 (Tex. App.
2001).
'0' Forum selection clauses were enforced in a number of consumer cases. See Forest v. Verizon
Comm. Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2002); DeJohn v. The TV Corp., 245 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill.
2003); Kilgallen v. Network Solutions, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. Mass. 2000) (rejecting a claim that
enforcing a forum selection clause would be unreasonable as it would do considerable damage by forcing a
small business to pursue the claim interstate); America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So.2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999); Groffv. America
Online, Inc., 1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super. May 27, 1998); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d
200 (Tex. App. 2001).
'0' See Forest, 805 A.2d at 1011.
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upheld the validity of Virginia jurisdiction clauses regardless of the
consequent denial of class action procedures. 10 7 These cases emphasize that
the plaintiffs enjoy individual remedies in Virginia's small claims courts
under the Virginia Consumer Protection Act of 1977. It seems that the class
action institution is generally not considered a "fundamental policy of the
forum" that, under The Bremen, allows a plaintiff to proceed in breach of a
forum selection clause. This weight of authority indicates that under the
Carnival approach, U.S. courts will send an aggrieved plaintiff to the other
end of the country to recover a small claim from an online or software
transaction gone bad, even when the size of the claim is smaller than the cost
of travel.
It must be noted that none of the shrink-wrap or click-wrap cases
decided thus far has determined the enforceability of exclusive jurisdiction
clauses in the international context. While it is clear that The Bremen
applies to international commercial contracts, it is uncertain whether
Carnival would permit the enforcement of an international jurisdiction
clause in a consumer context. Although Carnival expounds a very liberal
approach to forum selection clauses, the dissenting opinion noted that the
majority did not make clear whether the clause would apply if the Shutes
were required to sue in Panama, Carnival's place of incorporation.' 0 8 Even
if exclusive jurisdiction clauses are held unenforceable against consumers in
an international context, they undeniably impose a significant burden on
consumers in a domestic context.
b. UCITA: Section 110
The UCITA's rule on forum selection formalizes the post-Carnival
position under U.S. law in respect of mass-market EULAs. Section 110 of
the UCITA provides that "[t]he parties in their agreement may choose an
107 See generally, id. See also Koch, 139 F. Supp. 2d 690; Booker, 781 So.2d 423. However, in
America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) the
court held that an exclusive Virginia jurisdiction clause in a click-wrap contract was unenforceable. In
support of its decision, the court noted that the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act ("CLRA")
contained a provision that voids any purported waiver of rights under the CLRA as contrary to California
public policy. Id. at 702. The court held that enforcement of the forum selection clause would be the
functional equivalent of a contractual waiver of the consumer protections under the CLRA and therefore
prohibited under California law. Id. at 710. The court based its rationale largely on the fact that under the
CLRA there was a right of class action that was effectively denied if the consumer had to sue under the
Virginia Consumer Protection Act. Id. at 712. In Williams v. America Online, Inc., 2001 WL 135825
(Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2001) the court applied similar reasoning as in America Online v. Superior Court
in refusing to enforce a Virginia exclusive jurisdiction clause.
"' Carnival, 499 U.S. at 604 n.6 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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exclusive judicial forum unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust."' 09
The official comment provides that "[c]hoice of a forum at a party's location
is ordinarily reasonable." ' 10 The comment notes that this approach is largely
justified due to the inherent uncertainty that underlies e-commerce, in that a
business is exposed to the jurisdictions of "all states and all countries."I'
Citing the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Carnival with respect to
passenger tickets, the importance of jurisdiction clauses in e-commerce is
highlighted because of their capacity to mitigate potential costs of multi-
jurisdictional exposure. 12
While the U.S. position under the UCITA and common law is clear
and predictable for business, the strong enforcement policy at the consumer
level must be questioned. Because consumer claims are typically small, the
cost of travel is likely to be prohibitively expensive in relation to the sum in
dispute. In such cases, the enforcement of the jurisdiction clause will
usually determine the outcome of the entire dispute, leaving the consumer
without redress. If Internet consumers realize that their access to civil
justice is attenuated the further they shop from home, there is a real risk that
they will start shopping locally, discriminating against foreign retailers or
service providers. The clarity and predictability for business that is a result
of strong enforcement policy under U.S. law comes at the expense of
uncertainty and risk for the consumer.
2. Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in the European Union: Protecting
Consumer Rights
Unlike U.S. law, E.U. law recognizes that consumers must be
protected against the risk of international litigation. At the business-to-
business level, the enforcement of a valid jurisdiction clause is mandatory
under E.U. law. However, if one of the parties is a consumer, the clause has
no effect. The result is that the burden of international litigation is squarely
placed on the licensor or online service provider.
At the business-to-business level, E.U. law provides an enforcement
policy to exclusive jurisdiction clauses that matches that of the United
States. The Brussels Regulation" 3 and Lugano Convention' 14-- which apply
:09 UCITA, supra note 13, § 110(a).
'0 Id. § 110 cmt 3.
Id. Emphasis in original.
112 Id.
113 Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 [hereinafter Brussels
Regulation].
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between members of the European Union and other European countries-are
the only functional international treaties that address the use of jurisdiction
clauses. The default position under these treaties is that a defendant must be
sued in its domicile or the place of performance of its contractual duties.'
1 5
The treaties provide that where the parties use a jurisdiction clause, the
venue specified in that clause "shall" have exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter.1 6  If one of the parties is domiciled in the selected jurisdiction,
enforcement of the clause is mandatory; there is no residual discretion for
the specified court to decline jurisdiction or for other courts to accept
jurisdiction.' 17
The Brussels Regulation and Lugano Convention provide protection
for the consumer against the risk of international litigation. In relation to
consumer contracts, a jurisdiction agreement has no effect unless it is
entered into after the dispute has arisen." 8  Without a post-dispute
agreement, consumers are allowed to sue in either their home state or the
defendant's home state.119 This consumer protection provision is subject to
either of the following requirements, which are substantially equivalent to
the requirement of "purposeful availment" under U.S. law: 12  (1) the
"contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or
professional activities in the [venue] of the consumer's domicile or, by any
means, directs such activities to that [venue]"; 121 or (2) the "contract was
preceded by a specific invitation addressed to [the consumer] or by
advertising".
122
E.U. law emphasizes consumer protection over freedom of contract in
its regulation of exclusive jurisdiction clauses. Although such an approach
is likely to expose a business to more jurisdictions and thus entails greater
114 88/592/EEC, Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1998 O.J. (L319) 9 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
115 Brussels Regulation, supra note 113, arts. 5(l)(a) & 6; Lugano Convention, supra note 114, arts.
5(1) & 6.
:6 Brussels Regulation, supra note 113, art. 23(1); Lugano Convention, supra note 114, art. 17(1).
7 SMITHS CONFLICT OF LAWS 254 (John O'Brien, ed., 2d ed. 1999). See also DICEY AND MORRIS
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 425 & 441 (Lawrence Collins, ed., 13th ed. 2000), where the author discusses the
lack of discretion under article 17 of the Lugano Convention and article 17 of the Brussels Convention.
The Brussels Convention is the predecessor to the Brussels Regulation. Article 17 of the Brussels
Convention is virtually identical to article 23 of the Brussels Regulation.
: Brussels Regulation, supra note 113, art. 15; Lugano Convention, supra note 114, art. 14.
19 Brussels Regulation, supra note 113, art. 17; Lugano Convention, supra note 114, art. 15.
120 See Assad Siddiqui, Welcome To the City ofBytes? An Assessment of the Traditional Methods
Employed in the International Application ofJurisdiction over Internet Activities - Including a Critique of
Suggested Approaches, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 43, 82-83 (2001).
121 Brussels Regulation, supra note 113, art. 15(l)(c).
122 Lugano Convention, supra note 114, art. 13(3)(a).
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business to jurisdiction in "all states and all countries." A business is only
exposed to jurisdictions where it directs its business or advertising.
3. Exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses in Australia: Unacceptable Legal
Uncertainty
In contrast to the strong enforcement policy that exists in the United
States and European Union, Australian law gives a plaintiff more scope to
avoid an exclusive jurisdiction clause. This extra scope is largely due to the
discretion Australian judges retain to not enforce such clauses because of the
public policy rationale that a court's jurisdiction cannot be ousted by
agreement. 123 In light of the progressive approaches of the United States and
the European Union, the retention of this judicial discretion is parochial and
does little for certainty and predictability in e-commerce transactions.
Under Australian law, judicial discretion will be exercised in favor of
the plaintiff if the plaintiff can demonstrate that there are "strong grounds"
or "exceptional circumstances" that justify a continuance of proceedings in
the forum.1 24 In a widely cited passage, Justice Brandon in The Eleftheria125
summarized the factors that Anglo-Australian courts have tended to take into
account in determining whether to invalidate an exclusive jurisdiction
clause:
(a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is
situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that
on the relative convenience and expense of trial as
between the English and foreign courts;
(b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies and, if so,
whether it differs from English law in any material
respects;
(c) With what country either party is connected, and how
closely;
(d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the
foreign country, or are only seeking procedural
advantages;
(e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to
sue in the foreign court because they would-
123 id.
:24 See Akai Pty. Ltd. v. People's Ins. Co. (1996) 141 A.L.R. 374, 394.
25 The Eleftheria [1969] 2 All E.R. 641.
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(e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to
sue in the foreign court because they would-
(i) be deprived of security for that claim,
(ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained
(iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in England,
or
(iv) -for political, racial, religious or other reasons be
unlikely to get a fair trial.'26
These factors are not exhaustive; courts take into account all the
circumstances of a particular case. 127 In the same vein, it has been noted by
Justice Dixon in Huddart Parker v. The Ship Hill Mill,'28 that the "discretion
has not been restricted by any exclusive definition of the circumstances
which will warrant a refusal of a stay."'
129
Despite the doctrinal requirement that "strong grounds" are required
to negate an exclusive jurisdiction clause, Australian cases illustrate that
courts regularly refuse to enforce such clauses on the grounds that the
balance of procedural convenience favors a trial in the local forum.
130
Where a plaintiff can demonstrate that the majority of witnesses reside in the
forum, a court is unlikely to enforce an exclusive jurisdiction clause.
131
Additionally, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the foreign forum is
unlikely to apply an Australian mandatory remedial rule,' 32 or that the
plaintiff will lose a legitimate juridical advantage, 133 the clause will be
deemed unenforceable even if the parties are large commercial entities with
equal bargaining power.
The two reported cases that have considered an exclusive jurisdiction
clause in a non-negotiated standard form context give little guidance as to
the circumstances when they will be enforced. In Hopkins v. Difrex Societe
Anonyme, 134 the court refused to enforce a French jurisdiction clause in an
employment contract because most of the witnesses resided in Australia and
'26 Id. at 645.
127 id.
121 (1950) 81 C.L.R. 502.
129 Id. at 509.
130 See Richard Garnett, The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Clauses in Australia, 21(1) U. NEW S.
WALES L.J. 1, 11 (1998).
... Id. at 11-16.
132 See Akai Pty. Ltd. v. People's Ins. Co. (1996) 141 A.L.R. 374, 375.
133 See Garnett, supra note 130.
134 [1966] 1 N.S.W.R. 797.
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Australian law was to govern the dispute. Gamett suggests that the court
might have been influenced by the disparate bargaining power between the
two parties. 35 However, in Oceanic Shipping v. Fay,136 it was indicated by
Justice Brennan that he would have sent a consumer plaintiff to Athens if an
exclusive jurisdiction clause had been properly incorporated into a cruise
ticket:
In my opinion, had the plaintiff been bound by the clause, there
would have been no reason the relief to which the plaintiff was
entitled should not have been determined by the Athenian
courts. Before a court can refuse to enforce a contractual
stipulation in order to allow a plaintiff a right to sue which he
has bargained away the court must have substantial grounds
prevailing over what Dixon J. in The "Mill Hill" (at 509) called
"a strong bias in favour of maintaining the special bargain."'3
This conclusion is clearly obiter dicta in that, as the clause was not
part of the contract, the case was decided on forum non conveniens grounds
in the plaintiffs favor. Furthermore, Brennan's comments must be
considered in light of the fact that two of the five justices were prepared to
order a stay without the jurisdiction clause being incorporated in the
contract.
38
It has been observed that where there is a discrepancy in bargaining
power, Australian courts have a greater willingness to invalidate foreign
jurisdiction clauses to aid weaker plaintiffs. 139 This observation is difficult
to justify because of the scant authority on the point and the obiter dictum
from Justice Brennan in Oceanic that suggests otherwise. The conclusion
seems to be based on the assumption that if forum selection clauses are
relatively easy to avoid where the parties are commercial entities and the
plaintiff shows that procedural convenience is best served by litigation in the
forum, then a fortiori, a weak plaintiff who can demonstrate the same
133 Garnett, supra note 130, at 15.
136 (1988) 165 C.L.R. 197. The facts of Oceanic are similar to Carnival; the plaintiff suffered injury
on a cruise ship in the Greek Islands and an exclusive jurisdiction clause on the back of the ticket limited
litigation to Athens. An important difference between two cases is that the court in Oceanic considered the
clause not to be a part of the contract because the ticket was not given to the plaintiff until after his arrival
in Athens two days before the cruise. This fact precluded any reasonable notice of the terms.
' Id. at 231.
1 A stay was denied by majority judgement of 3-2. Id. at 197-99.
,39 See Copyright Law Review Committee, supra note 82, at 188. See also Transnational Jurisdiction
in Cyberspace Project, Comment-Australia 69, available at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/cyberlaw/docs/foreign/Australia-Swinson.htnl (last visited May 21, 2004).
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convenience should be able to avoid the clause. Although this assumption
may have some merit, Justice Brennan's comments in Oceanic suggest that
it may be hard to argue that a weaker local plaintiff should be able to
proceed in breach of a foreign jurisdiction clause where the balance of
procedural convenience favors the contractually designated forum.
The current Australian case law does not provide guidance on whether
exclusive jurisdiction clauses will be enforced in the e-commerce context.
While some cases have emphasized "a strong bias in favour of maintaining
the special bargain"'' 40 other cases demonstrate that "Australian courts have,
at times, excessively sought to protect their residents from having to litigate
overseas."14 1  Such uncertainty encourages parties to engage in wasteful
litigation over whether jurisdiction clauses should be enforced.
4. Jurisdiction Clauses: Advocating a New Australian Position
When compared to the U.S. and E.U. positions on exclusive
jurisdiction clauses, Australian law is undeniably the most unwelcoming
toward contractual forum selection. Australian courts need to more strictly
enforce exclusive jurisdiction clauses in business-to-business transactions in
order to bring Australian law in line with the laws of other developed
countries. However, in the business-to-consumer context, the burden of
international litigation should be placed on the software company or online
service provider.
In order to align Australian law with the laws of other developed
countries, Australian courts must more strictly enforce commercial exclusive
jurisdiction clauses. Furthermore, Australia's discretionary enforcement of
international exclusive jurisdiction clauses does not make sense in light of
the mandatory enforcement of international binding arbitration clauses under
Australia's International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth). 142  In business-to-
business transactions, rather than adhering to the unpredictable "strong
reasons" approach, this Article suggests that Australian courts adopt a
stricter test. U.S. jurisprudence provides a potential guide for Australian
courts; the "unfair and unreasonable" test under U.S. law provides a more
predictable test by casting a heavier burden of proof on the plaintiff who
wishes to invalidate the clause. 143 Furthermore, the U.S. test considerably
140 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
141 Garnett, supra note 130.
142 Bond Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. Thiess Contractors Pty. Ltd. (1987) 14 F.C.R. 193.
143 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 16 (1972).
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reduces the scope for the judge to overrule a jurisdiction clause on the basis
that procedural convenience favors trial in the local forum. 144
In the business-to-consumer context, Australian law should adopt the
protective policy of the European Union. U.S. law inappropriately places
the risk of international litigation on the consumer. U.S. common law and
the UCITA essentially allow software manufacturers and online service
providers to specify their place of business as the venue for litigation. Given
the rules of forum selection articulated in Carnival, it is unlikely that a U.S.
firm engaging in mass-market online transactions would choose a venue
other than its home state. By deeming such a selection "ordinarily
reasonable," U.S. law burdens the consumer with the risk of international
litigation.
The inadequacy of the U.S. approach is revealed by critically
considering the largely economic reasoning employed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Carnival within an e-commerce context. The argument that a
software manufacturer or online service provider has a legitimate interest in
limiting the venues where it can be sued is inadequate to support exclusive
jurisdiction clauses. This argument is somewhat truistic and applies equally
to consumers who have a legitimate interest in limiting the venues where
they may have to make their claims. In other words, plaintiffs and
defendants both have an equal interest in being able to sue in their own
backyards. The Carnival approach simply places the risk of foreign
litigation of the consumer, who is unlikely to anticipate such a risk or be in a
position to take steps to insure against it.
Exclusive jurisdiction clauses arguably ensure predictability by
reducing litigation over the forum in which parties may advance their
claims. However, strictly enforcing consumer jurisdiction clauses will have
a minimal effect on the volume of preliminary jurisdictional hearings in
consumer cases. Instead of hearing motions by the defendant based on
"minimum contacts" or forum non conveniens considerations, Australian
courts would hear arguments by plaintiffs who claim that such clauses
effectively deny them their day in court, or deny them the benefit of a
substantive or procedural rule.
Finally, the notion that software manufacturers and online service
providers will pass on their savings to consumers is hard to justify in the
144 The plaintiff must show that the inconvenience is so great that they would be "denied their day in
court." Id. at 18.
145 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991). See supra notes 101-103 and
accompanying text. This reasoning was cited approvingly in the official comment to the forum selection
section of UCITA.
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context of the Internet economy. It may be true that in a perfect market, as a
result of robust competition, a vendor may be forced to pass on to the
consumer whatever savings it may incur. However, the information
economy is characterized by the existence of large monopolies that are
strengthened by "network effects. 146 One only needs to look at the markets
for PC operating systems and office applications, online auction services,
and online retail to see that they are dominated by the likes of Microsoft,
eBay, and Amazon respectively. Against this monopolistic backdrop, it is
more likely that cost savings will primarily be passed on to shareholders
rather than consumers.
Australia should adopt the consumer protection approach to the
enforcement of jurisdiction clauses evinced in the Brussels Regulation and
Lugano Convention. This approach places the risk of foreign litigation on
software companies and online service providers who are more likely to be
able to insure against it. Predictability for consumers in the online
environment would be further increased, making e-commerce a more
attractive purchasing avenue.
B. Binding Arbitration Clauses
Arbitration clauses are similar to jurisdiction clauses in that both
clauses aim to provide a predictable forum for dispute resolution.
Furthermore, both clauses are used to limit the risks of international
litigation by specifying a court that shall have jurisdiction or the seat of
arbitration. Arbitration clauses additionally limit the risk of protracted
litigation by streamlining certain procedural aspects. For example,
discovery may be limited in duration and witness examination may be
conducted informally.
Unlike jurisdiction clauses, arbitration clauses are supported by a
strong international framework that provides for the recognition of both
arbitration agreements and arbitration awards-the New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 14 7 Article
2 of the Convention provides that:
146 See Lindsay, supra note 73, at 111-15.
147 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. In relation to jurisdiction agreements,
The Hague Conference on Private International law produced a preliminary draft convention in 1999.
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Oct. 30, 1999, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
The Draft Hague Convention deals with numerous jurisdictional issues and issues related to the
enforcement of foreign judgements. However, the possibility of the Draft Hague Convention coming into
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[e]ach contracting state shall recognize an agreement under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration.
Article 2(111) further stipulates that:
[t]he court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of
the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed. 1
48
Article 2 provides a mandatory enforcement procedure for arbitration
agreements-unless the agreement is "invalid" or "inoperative" the court
must enforce it.149  The New York Convention has been ratified by 134
nations and is perceived as representing customary international law.
50
However, the convention permits signatories to enact a commercial
reservation-a signatory can "declare that it will apply the Convention only
to differences arising out of legal relationships . . . which are considered as
commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration."
'151
The commercial reservation is intended to exclude, among other things,
consumer contracts from the scope of the New York Convention.1
52
Approximately one-third of the signatories have applied this commercial
reservation, including the United States.' 53
force anytime soon is in doubt in light of strong opposition coming from the United States. Mary Shannon
Martin, Note, Keep it Online: The Hague Convention and the Need for Online Alternative Dispute
Resolution in International Business-to-Consumer E-Commerce, 20 B.U. INT'L L.J. 125, 143-47 (2002).
"' New York Convention, supra note 147, art. II § 3 (emphasis added).
149 Richard Garnett, International Arbitration Law: Progress Toward Harmonisation, 3(2)
MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 400, 403 (2002).
"50 Id. See also United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status of Conventions and
Model Laws, available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/status-e.htm (last visited May 21, 2004)
[hereinafter UNCITRAL].
15' New York Convention, supra note 147, art. 1(3).
152 Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Online Arbitration of Cross-Border, Business to Consumer
Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1135-36 (2002).
153 Jane L. Volz & Roger S. Haydock, Foreign Arbitral Awards: Enforcing the Award Against the
Recalcitrant Loser, 21 WM MITCHELL L. REV. 867, 879 & 888 (1996).
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Despite the settled nature of the enforceability of commercial
arbitration agreements, the enforceability of these contractual terms remains
debatable in some jurisdictions when found within consumer contracts.
While U.S. law is very receptive to consumer arbitration clauses, E.U. law
effectively imposes an outright ban. Currently, Australian law does not
afford consumers additional protection from arbitration clauses, and it would
seem that, at the international level, enforcement of a consumer arbitration
clause is mandatory. This section argues that Australia should go its own
way and not follow the extreme positions taken by the United States and
European Union. Australian courts should be empowered to rewrite
arbitration clauses to reach a fair outcome. An outright ban on consumer
arbitration clauses ignores the procedural benefits that arbitration provides,
while a blanket pro-enforcement policy ignores the fact that arbitration
clauses can be drafted in a way that unfairly prejudices a consumer's right of
redress.
1. Binding Arbitration Clauses in the United States: Strict Enforcement
ofArbitration Agreements
In the United States, the common law was generally hostile to
arbitration clauses, as they were perceived to be ouster agreements and
hence contrary to public policy.15 4 However, legislative developments in
state, federal, and international law generally provide that arbitration
agreements should be enforced like any other contract. Section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")15 5 provides that an arbitration clause "shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' 56 The FAA applies to
all written contracts involving interstate or foreign commerce and is thus
highly applicable to e-commerce. 57 The FAA also enacts the New York
Convention into U.S. domestic law. 58 However, because the United States
has applied the commercial reservation, the FAA does not apply to non-
commercial consumer transactions in the international context.15 The FAA
still applies, nevertheless, to consumer transactions in the domestic context.
154 Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
"' 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
156 Id.
157 9 U.S.C. § I provides that the title applies to contracts arising from "commerce among the several
States or with foreign nations".
"8 Id. § 201.
s9 Id. § 202. Stewart & Matthews, supra note 152, at 1133.
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The FAA evinces a "strong federal policy supporting arbitration.'' 60
The FAA does not provide for broad judicial discretion to not enforce
domestic or international arbitration clauses. Rather, courts are compelled to
order a stay when confronted with a valid arbitration agreement. 6  Under
the FAA, the only way to invalidate an arbitration agreement is to
demonstrate that an equitable or legal contract rule vitiates that agreement. 62
To avoid the clause, the plaintiff must, for example, prove lack of proper
assent or that the clause is void due to unconscionability, duress, or undue
influence. U.S. federal courts are very unreceptive to arguments that the
agreement is void due to public policy, or that dispute in not amenable to
arbitration. 1
63
In the context of EULAs and e-commerce standard forms, state and
federal courts in the United States have generally upheld the pro-arbitration
policy underlying the FAA and have enforced arbitration clauses. 64 The
recent reported cases all involve consumers and have generallyv considered
clauses that only permit individual, rather than class actions., However,
two consumer cases demonstrate that unconscionability arguments leveled at
arbitration clauses may be invoked successfully, although with quite
different possible outcomes. One court chose to entirely invalidate the
arbitration agreement while the other chose to enforce the agreement after
correcting the unconscionable aspect.
The judgment of the federal court in Comb v. PayPal66 indicates that
an arbitration clause may be wholly invalidated on the basis of
unconscionability. The defendant, PayPal, provided a consumer-to-
consumer payment service that would debit a payer's nominated credit card
or bank account and provide the payee with a PayPal account to access the
money. 67 In 2001, PayPal's usage boomed from ten thousand to twelve
million users, causing severe staffing shortages. Mismanaged customer
'6' THOMAS CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND
DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 107 (1989).
161 Id. at 106.
162 9 U.S.C. § 2.
163 Donna M. Bates, A Consumer's Dream or a Pandora's Box: Is Arbitration a Viable Option for
Cross-border Consumer Disputes?, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 823, 874-77 (2004).64 Arbitration clauses were enforced in a number of cases. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Lieschke v. Real Networks, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1683 (N.D. II1. Feb. 10, 2000);
O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, 256 F. Supp. 2d 512 (M.D. La. 2003); Westendorfv. Gateway 2000, Inc., 41
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1110 (Del. Ch. 2000); Levy v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1060
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
165 All the cases cited supra note 164 involve consumer transactions.
:66 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
167 Id. at 1166.
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service resulted in a backlog of over 100,000 unanswered complaints.' 
8
The plaintiffs argued that PayPal had profited from their negligence by
retaining funds from complaints that have been abandoned because of
consumer frustration. 169 PayPal's click-wrap user agreement had a binding
arbitration clause that (1) prohibited consolidation of claims, (2) selected
Santa Clara County in California as the place of dispute, and (3) selected the
American Arbitration Association rules to govern the dispute settlement."'
The court held that the arbitration agreement was a contract of
adhesion and thus procedurally unconscionable. The court further held that
the arbitration agreement was substantially unconscionable firstly, due to a
lack of mutuality, and secondly, due to the practical effects of the arbitration
clause in relation to consolidation of claims, costs of arbitration, and
venue.' 71 The court noted that precluding the consolidation of small claims
was substantially unconscionable because of the small nature of the disputes
at issue. 172 Another strike against the clause was the fact that arbitration was
to follow the American Arbitration Association's commercial, as opposed to
consumer, rules and thus would require the plaintiffs to pay their own
costs. 173 Finally, PayPal's choice of venue was unconscionable given that its
customers were located all over the country and the average transaction was
only US$ 55.174
PayPal stands in isolation from and is out of line with existing U.S.
authority. Counsel for PayPal highlighted federal cases where arbitration
agreements barring consolidation of individual claims were enforced. 175 The
court ignored this line of authority and relied instead on a recent California
decision Szetela v. Discover Bank 7 6 to bolster its position. 77 However,
Szetela has since been overturned on appeal in favor of the federal line of
authority cited by counsel for PayPal. PayPal's finding in relation to
choice of venue seemingly ignores the Carnival holding that there is nothing
inherently unreasonable about choice of venue in a defendant's jurisdiction.
'6s Id. at 1167.
169 id.
170 Id. at 1170.
171 Id. at 1172-77.
171 Id. at 1175.
171 Id. at 1176.
'7 Id. at 1177.
175 See, e.g., Champ v. Siegal Trading Co, 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995) and Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), cited in Paypal, 218 F.Supp. 2d at 1176.
:76 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
'77 Paypal, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1176.
178 Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 105 Cal. App. 4th 326 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003).
VOL. 13 No. 3
DIGITAL AGE STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
Additionally, PayPal is unlikely to be useful authority in avoiding a class
action arbitration waiver because there were significant other grounds in the
case, such as the lack of mutuality, to hold the agreement unconscionable. 1
79
Another U.S. case indicates that if the designated arbitral process is
unconscionable, the court may appoint a different arbitrator to decide the
dispute or to otherwise correct the deficiencies in the arbitration clause. In
Brower v. Gateway 2000,180 the impugned aspect of the clause was the
appointment of a relatively expensive arbitrator-the International Chamber
of Commerce. The court deemed that the International Chamber of
Commerce's arbitration filing fees were prohibitively expensive considering
the amounts claimed and were therefore unconscionable.18' However,
instead of allowing the action to proceed in court, as in PayPal, the matter
was referred back to the trial court to seek appointment of a cheaper
arbitrator pursuant to section 5 of the FAA. 182 It is submitted that this is the
preferable judicial approach when dealing with an arbitration clause that has
burdensome procedural rules for a particular party. To simply deny the
clause any validity when only one aspect of it is onerous frustrates the pro-
arbitration policies of the FAA.
2. Binding Arbitration Clauses in the European Union: Protecting
Consumer Rights
Unlike U.S. law, E.U. law is extremely hostile to the use of arbitration
clauses in consumer contracts. Because most European countries have
enacted the New York Convention, arbitration clauses in international
commercial contracts are generally enforceable. 8 3 However, regardless of
whether the New York Convention's commercial reservation has been
employed, arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are rendered void under
79 In relation to the lack of mutuality, although the arbitration clause permitted either party to gain a
preliminary injunction in relation to assets in dispute prior to arbitration, another clause allowed PayPal to
unilaterally suspend accounts, and freeze funds within, during the course of an investigation. The court
reasoned that the costs of gaining an injunction to unfreeze the account are prohibitively expensive in
relation to the amount frozen. Paypal, 218 F.Supp. 2d at 1174-75. The contract also lacked mutuality in
respect of PayPal's ability to unilaterally alter the agreement. PayPal did not demonstrate any "commercial
realities" under the circumstances of the business that required such one-sidedness. Id. at 1174-75.
"0 246 A.D.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
'"' Id. at 254-255.
182 Id.
183 See UNCITRAL, supra, note 150.
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the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive ("UTCCD"). 184 Article
3(1) of the UTCCD provides that:
[a] contractual term which has not been individually negotiated
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties'
rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the
detriment of the consumer.
Article 6 requires E.U. member states to enact laws that render
unenforceable unfair terms against a consumer. The Annex to the UTCCD
provides a non-exhaustive list of terms that may be regarded as unfair. A
term is considered unjust if it has the effect of
excluding or hindering the consumer's right to take legal action
or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the
consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered
by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available to
him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to
the applicable law, should lie with another party to the
contract.' 5
Although the meaning of "arbitration not covered by legal provisions"
is unclear, the U.K. Office of Fair Trading interpreted the above passage to
bar the use of compulsory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts.'
8 6
Likewise, French law takes a similar position when an arbitration clause
purports to exclude a consumer's recourse to the courts.
18 7
"' Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, available
at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/unfa cont-term/uctOl-en.pdf (last
visited May 21, 2004).
185 Emphasis added.
18' See Office of Fair Trade, Annexe A: Examples of Fair and Unfair Terms 134-35, Feb. 2001,
available at http://www.ofi.gov.uk/Business/Legal+Powers/unfair+guidance.htm (last visited May 21,
2004)i87 See Christopher Kuner, Legal Obstacles to ADR in European Business-to-Consumer Electronic
Commerce, available at http://www.kuner.com/data/pay/adr.htmil (last visited May 21, 2004).
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3. Binding Arbitration in Australia: No Explicit Consumer Protection,
Plenty of Discretion in the Domestic Context
Unlike the European Union, Australian law does not generally
recognize that consumers need protection from arbitration clauses. In fact,
because Australia has not implemented the commercial reservation to the
New York Convention,'88 international arbitration clauses in a consumer
context require mandatory enforcement. From this aspect alone, one might
conclude that Australia has a strong enforcement policy in relation to
arbitration agreements. This conclusion would be wrong, however, because
in a domestic context, judges are given broad discretion to not enforce
arbitration agreements.'
8
Australian law treats domestic arbitration clauses and international
arbitration clauses very differently. The former are governed by the state
Commercial Arbitration Acts,' 90 which give the courts wide discretion in
determining whether to order a stay.' 9' Although there is a formal bias
toward enforcing an arbitration agreement, a plaintiff only needs to
demonstrate that a "sufficient" reason exists for denying a stay. 192  Such
reasons have included allegations of fraud or professional impropriety.
93
Sometimes a stay is granted simply because the case involves complicated
questions of law that the court can handle better than a selected arbitrator.,
94
Furthermore, courts are unlikely to require arbitration if it would result in a
multiplicity of proceedings.'
95
However, in regards to an international arbitration agreement, there is
no wide discretion for a court to refuse a stay. The International Arbitration
Act 1974 (Cth) ("IAA") implements the New York Convention and
generally provides that a stay is mandatory if it falls under the act. Section 7
provides that an arbitration agreement falls under the act if one of the
following applies:
188 See UNCITRAL, supra note 150.
189 See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
'90 Commercial Arbitration Act, 1990 (Austl., QLD); Commercial Arbitration Act, 1986 (Austl.,
ACT); Commercial Arbitration Act, 1986 (Austl., SA); Commercial Arbitration Act, 1986 (Austl., TAS);
Commercial Arbitration Act, 1985 (Austl., NT); Commercial Arbitration Act, 1985 (Austl., WA);
Commercial Arbitration Act, 1984 (Austl., NSW); Commercial Arbitration Act, 1984 (Austl., VIC).
191 The Commercial Arbitration Acts allow a court to grant a stay if there is "there is no sufficient
reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the agreement." § 53(l)(a).
192 Id.
193 Conagra Int'l Fertiliser Co. v. LiefInvestments Pty. Ltd. (1997) 141 F.L.R. 124.
94 O'Neill & Clayton Pty. Ltd. v. Ellis & Clark Pty. Ltd. (1978) 20 S.A. St. R. 132.
195 Bond Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. Thiess Contractors Pty. Ltd. (1987) 14 F.C.R. 193.
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(a) The arbitral procedure is governed by another convention
country;
(b) The arbitral procedure is governed by a non-convention
country and one of the parties is domiciled in Australia;
(c) One of the parties a government of another convention
country; or
(d) One of the parties is domiciled in another convention
country.
If one of the above requirements is satisfied, and a party commences
an action in breach of the agreement, section 7(2) provides that, on
application of the other party, "the court shall, by order, upon such
conditions (if any) as it thinks fit, stay the proceedings or so much of the
proceedings as involves the determination of that matter". There is no
discretion under this provision.196 The only way that a plaintiff can avoid an
arbitration agreement within the scope of the IAA is by demonstrating that
the agreement is contrary to a mandatory rule of the forum, the dispute falls
outside the scope of the agreement as a matter of construction, or the
agreement is otherwise "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed."'197 Unlike the United States, Australia has not effected the
commercial reservation,'" meaning that the IAA applies equally to
consumer contracts. However, because section 7(2) of the IAA allows a
court to impose "such conditions (if any) as it thinks fit" the court may be
empowered to change the seat of arbitration in favor of the consumer.
D. Arbitration Clauses: Providing a Fairer Means to Resolve
International Business-to-Consumer E-Commerce Disputes
While the mandatory enforceability of valid arbitration clauses in
international commercial contracts has largely been settled by the New York
Convention, it is clear that the approaches taken by the European Union and
the United States in relation to arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are
polarized. 199 The United States has a strong bias in favor of consumer
arbitration while the European Union seems to reject it outright. 200  The
19 Hi-Fert v. Kiukiang Maritime Carriers (1997) 145 A.L.R. 500.
197 See Richard Garnett, The Current Status of Arbitration Agreements in Australia, 15 J. CONT. L.
29,47-51 (1999).
198 See UNCITRAL, supra note 150.
199 See generally, Christopher Drahozal, Unfair Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695 (2001).
200 See supra notes 164 and 185 and accompanying text.
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arguments in favor of arbitration are that it fosters a neutral and efficient
way of resolving disputes by abrogating inefficient procedural rules found in
court litigation. However, it is this abrogation of procedural rules that most
troubles consumer interest groups. 201 These groups argue that arbitration
abrogates "procedural rights" such as a trial by jury, the prospect of large
punitive damages and the avenue for class actions.202 Arbitration further
limits discovery and the right of appeal. Given that class actions, punitive
damages, trial by jury, and protracted discovery are as integral to the
Australian legal system as within the U.S. legal system, the argument that
arbitration clauses abrogate "procedural rights" is unconvincing.
Instead of adopting the European Union's outright ban on arbitration
agreements or the United States' strong faith in consumer arbitration,
Australian law should promote the use of fair and appropriate arbitration in
consumer cases. While courts should be encouraged to enforce arbitration
clauses in almost all circumstances, judges should also have the means to
modify proposed arbitration proceedings in the interests of justice.
Arbitration is potentially the fairest way to resolve international
business-to-consumer disputes arising from software and Internet
transactions. The need for oral testimony-an indispensable feature of
ordinary litigation-can be dispensed with in consumer arbitration
proceedings. Because proceedings can be conducted by deposition or even
via telephone, arbitration can be venue neutral.20 3 Venue neutrality in
arbitration proceedings means that instead of allocating the risk of
international litigation to the consumer or the retailer, the burden is
effectively shared between the parties. While no one gets to sue in his or her
own backyard, no one gets hauled halfway across the globe either.
When faced with a potentially unfair venue in a consumer arbitration
clause, rather than denying the clause any effect on grounds of
unconscionability or public policy, courts may arguably simply change the
venue or order a venue neutral proceeding. The power to rewrite an
arbitration clause to ameliorate its unfair effects must be grounded in a
statute because, under the common law, Australian courts are only
201 See Drahozal, supra note 199, at 705.
202 Id. at 705-2 1.
203 See, e.g., American Arbitration Associations, Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Related
Disputes, July 1, 2003, available at http://www.adr.org (last visited May 21, 2004), which allow hearings
to be conducted over the telephone with a filing fee of US$ 125, which can be awarded to the consumer if
the claim is successful.
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empowered to wholly sever an invalid term.204  This remedial power to
change arbitration agreements is arguably extant under Australia's IAA.
Australia's decision to implement the New York Convention without
the commercial reservation was made at a time when the potential for cross-
border consumer transactions was relatively weak.20 5 The proliferation of
international retail over the Internet may warrant amending the IAA to
exempt commercial transactions from mandatory enforcement. That said, it
is possible that Australian courts could promote the use of appropriate
arbitration procedures without change to the IAA. The IAA provides that
enforcement of an arbitration clause in an international consumer transaction
is mandatory, but allows a court to impose "such conditions (if any) as it
thinks fit". In the same way the New York Supreme Court in Brower
enforced an arbitration clause after ameliorating its unconscionable
elements,20 6 Australian judges should make liberal use of this provision for
conditions in the IAA. In business-to-consumer software and Internet
transactions, such a condition should be the imposition of a forum-neutral,
consumer-friendly arbitration process such as those provided under the
207consumer rules of the American Arbitration Association. By advocating
the use of just arbitration procedures, Australian courts can help ensure fair
and efficient dispute resolution within e-commerce transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Australian law should enforce EULAs and other online goods and
services agreements where the purchaser has had a reasonable opportunity to
review the terms prior to the assumption of binding obligations. Such
agreements, whether they be in the shrink-wrap, click-wrap or browse-wrap
format, are no different than other types of mass-market standard form
contracts. Indeed, the weight of authority in Anglo-Australian ticket cases
204 See CARTER& HARLAND, supra note 9, at 634-35. A good example of a statute that allows a court
to effectively rewrite an invalid term is the Restraints of Trade Act, 1976, § 4(1) (Austl., NSW), which
provides that an invalid restraint of trade clause be enforced to the extent that it is valid. However, this
statute is limited in that it only allows the term to be rewritten if it involves a reading-down process:
CARTER & HARLAND, supra note 9, at 638-41. The proposed power for a court to rewrite an unfair
arbitration clause discussed above goes beyond a power that would merely allow a court to enforce the fair
elements only. The proposed power to rewrite arbitration clauses may involve the court importing new
elements extrinsic to the original clause.
205 The IAA commenced operation in 1975. International Arbitration Act Notes, available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol act/iaa 1974276/notes.html (last visited May 21, 2004).
206 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
VOL. 13 No. 3
DIGITAL AGE STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
strongly suggests that Australian law is adequately prepared to deal with a
EULA should a court be faced with the question of its enforceability.
However, two features of Australian contract law pose obstacles to the
enforceability of EULAs. Firstly, the doctrine of privity entails that only
when a software company sells directly to the licensee will the licensee be
bound. To give their EULAs any effect, software companies must either not
use resellers, or make their resellers enter into complex agency agreements.
This complication could have a chilling effect on software distribution in
Australia. The Australian adherence to the doctrine of privity is outdated in
light of the positions of the United States and United Kingdom and must be
abolished by the legislature. Secondly, the "special notice" for "onerous
terms" rule is too uncertain in Australia for the compliance of licensors. The
rule forces licensors to create their own conclusions as to which terms in a
contract are onerous. While these conclusions may be obvious in respect of
exclusion and penalty clauses, exclusive jurisdiction clauses, binding
arbitration clauses, and other standard clauses could be considered onerous.
While the uncertainty surrounding the "onerous terms" rule is not fatal to the
enforcement of EULAs like the privity doctrine, the consequent
unpredictability is highly unfair to licensors. The Australian legislature
should follow the U.S. example and clearly identify when and how special
notice is required.
The realities of international trade over the Internet require a more
modem approach to be taken in respect of exclusive jurisdiction and
arbitration clauses. In relation to exclusive jurisdiction clauses, Australian
law should abandon the discretionary approach in favor of rules that
facilitate certainty. While it may be argued that a discretionary approach
helps facilitate the administration of justice in individual cases, such an
approach also facilitates parochialism and gives too much discretion for a
judge to discriminate against a foreign defendant in the interests of a local
plaintiff. At the business-to-business level, the enforcement of jurisdiction
clauses should be mandatory. Commercial entities are often sufficiently
resourced to handle foreign litigation. Furthermore, jurisdiction clauses in
the business-to-business context are more likely to have arisen from actual
negotiations. However, in business-to-consumer transactions, the burden of
international litigation should always be placed on the commercial entity.
Consumers neither have the resources to enter into foreign litigation nor are
they likely to anticipate, or insure against, the risk of foreign litigation.
With respect to consumer arbitration, Australia should decline to
follow the extreme approaches taken by the United States and European
Union. Rather, Australia should encourage forum-neutral, consumer-
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friendly arbitration in a dispute between distant parties. Courts can advocate
fair arbitration procedures if they are given the power to effectively rewrite
unfair arbitration clauses. Such a power may already exist in relation to both
international arbitration clauses under the IAA,2 °8 and domestic arbitration
clauses under the Commercial Arbitration Acts.2°9 Instead of wholly
refusing to enforce an unfair arbitration clause, a court should make liberal
use of the power to attach "conditions" or give "directions" to the conduct of
the arbitration. Such an approach takes into account both the practical
advantages arbitration offers in a dispute between distant parties, and the
fact that arbitration clauses can often be drafted in a way that unfairly
prejudices a consumer's right of redress.
208 Section 7(2) of the IAA provides that, on application of the other party, "the court shall, by order,
upon such conditions (if any) as it thinksfit, stay the proceedings or so much of the proceedings as involves
the determination of that matter" (emphasis added).
209 Section 53(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Acts, supra note 190, empowers the court to "give
such directions with respect to the future conduct of the arbitration as it thinks fit."
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